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Abstract 
This is a revised version of a previous working paper, of the 
same name, which incorporates corrections to errors in our 
estimates of TFP growth.† 
 
This paper examines major privately-owned British railway 
companies before World War I.  Quantitative evidence is presented 
on return on capital employed, total factor productivity growth, cost 
inefficiency, and speed of passenger services.  There were 
discrepancies in performance across companies but ROCE and 
TFP typically fell during our period.  Cost inefficiency rose before 
1900 but then was brought under control as a profits collapse 
loomed.  Without the discipline of either strong competition or 
effective regulation, managerial failure was common.  This sector is 
an important qualification to the conventional wisdom that late-
Victorian Britain did not fail. 
 
 
The management of Britain's railway companies in the period 
before World War I has frequently been severely criticised.  Poor 
productivity performance was highlighted by Foreman-Peck and Millward 
                                                 
∗ Financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council under grant 
R000239536 and under Public Service Programme grant RES-166-25-0032 is 
gratefully acknowledged.  We wish to thank Bob Allen, Tony Arnold, Dudley Baines, 
Peter Cain, David Chambers, Keith Cowling, Colin Divall, Roy Edwards, Terry 
Gourvish, Peter Howlett, Sean McCartney, Brian Mitchell and Cees Withagen and 
participants in seminars at Nottingham Trent and Oxford for helpful advice and 
comments, and to thank Judith Allen and Kevin Tennent for data entry.  We are 
indebted to Brian Mitchell for supplying us with his unpublished estimates of rates of 
return and to John Dodgson and Mary O’Mahony for their comments on our 
productivity estimates. The paper has been significantly improved by the comments of 
four anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies. 
† Working Paper No. 10 of the Large Scale Technological Change series (June 2007) 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/economicHistory/LSTC%20(ESRC)/Large-
ScaleTechnologicalChangeWP.htm 
 1
and attributed to managerial inertia and failure to reform outmoded 
methods and organisation while Arnold and McCartney concluded that 
returns to investors were consistently disappointing as management 
incurred unnecessary costs and neglected shareholder value.1  Even 
relatively sympathetic observers such as Cain conclude that 'there was 
waste and inefficiency in the railway system of Great Britain between 
1870 and 1914'.2  Finally, it should also be noted that both Cain and 
Irving stress that when, after 1900, profits were threatened by rising costs 
and a regulatory freeze on freight charges, railway management at last 
took serious steps to improve operating efficiency.3 
So, railways are perhaps an exception to the neoclassical 
exoneration of late Victorian and Edwardian management which focused 
mainly on manufacturing sectors in which the degrees of freedom for 
managers to fail were greatly constrained by competition.4 Railways were 
also a sector in which it has been claimed ‘inertia was encouraged by an 
absence of competition’.5 This is consistent with the important account of 
British relative economic decline set out by Broadberry which stresses the 
pivotal role of the service sector in which the initial British productivity 
lead was later reversed by the United States and Germany.  Broadberry 
stresses that Britain did particularly badly in services that became 
'industrialized', i.e., those that became high-volume, low-margin business 
in which hierarchical management was able to deliver substantial 
productivity gains.  Railways were the first sector to make this transition.6  
If railway companies generally have been seen as badly run, the 
North Eastern Railway has been seen as an outstanding exception, at 
                                                 
1 Foreman-Peck and Millward, Public and Private Ownership, 88-91.; Arnold and 
McCartney, “Rates of Return”. 
2 Cain, “Railways, 1870-1914”, p.120. 
3 Cain, “Railways, 1870-1914”, p. 117; Irving, “Profitability and Performance”, p. 58. 
4 The neoclassical position is well summarized in McCloskey and Sandberg, “From 
Damnation to Redemption”. 
5 Foreman-Peck and Millward, Public and Private Ownership, p. 90. 
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least from the point where George Gibb became General Manager in 
1891.  George Paish, the economist and contemporary scourge of railway 
management practices declared that in the case of the North Eastern 
'men of progressive and enlightened views control the line [and] have 
shown wisdom and foresight'.7  Recent scholars have also extolled its 
virtues.  Irving, the company's historian, remarked that 'a package of 
reforms was developed that was sufficiently radical to place the North 
Eastern, in terms of efficiency, at the forefront of home railways' while 
Cain in the best textbook account described the North Eastern as 
'universally acknowledged to be well managed' and Dodgson in his paper 
on productivity performance in major railway companies gave the North 
Eastern an accolade as the 'best practice' company.8  By contrast, the 
Great Central has often been severely criticised, especially for its 
investment in a line to London and its inability to pay dividends.9 
The criterion by which the new economic historians sought to judge 
managers was profit maximization (which under conditions of competition 
will also entail cost minimization).  This may seem to suggest that 
management should be judged on the rate of return on assets employed 
that they achieve and certainly this can be expected to be the main 
concern of shareholders.  However, high rates of return can stem from 
market power rather than outstanding management and, in such 
circumstances, high profitability may also be based partly on poor levels 
of service, as regulators of privatized utilities are only too well aware.10 
Where there is also separation of ownership from control, even where 
profits are high costs may not be minimized because of the non-
alignment of the interests of managers and shareholders (principal-agent 
                                                                                                                                               
6 Broadberry, Market Services. 
7 Paish, The British Railway Position, p. 235. 
8 Irving, The North Eastern Railway, p. 283,: Cain “Railways, 1870-1914”, p. 111; 
Dodgson, “British Railway Cost Functions”, p. 176. 
9 For example, Aldcroft, British Railways, ch. 1. 
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problems).11  This suggests that performance of British railway 
companies a century ago needs to be considered not only in terms of 
profitability but at the same time taking into account how far actual costs 
exceeded minimum feasible costs and quality of service to customers. 
In any case, some investigators see profit maximization as too 
narrow a criterion; for example, in his evaluation of business performance 
in the early twentieth century, Arnold notes that critics of the profit-
maximizing approach might see organizational success in terms of value 
added which identifies returns to a wider group of stakeholders including 
factors of production other than capital.12  For the economy as a whole, 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth is both the source of increases in 
returns to factors of production and also the key determinant of long run 
growth.  This wider perspective highlights TFP growth as a very important 
criterion of company performance and this is implicitly endorsed by the 
British approach to privatization which incentivizes TFP growth including 
the removal of cost inefficiencies through RPI - X regulation, which limits 
price rises to the rate of inflation less an amount, X.13  
The principal railway companies in Britain varied significantly in 
scale, scope and orientation. By track miles the largest (Great Western) 
was 22 times the scale of the smallest company in our sample (Taff 
Vale), by train miles and receipts the largest (London and North Western) 
was 19 and 17 times respectively the size of the smallest (again, Taff 
                                                                                                                                               
10 Green and Haskel, “Seeking a Premier League Economy”. 
11 The only railway share registers known to survive are those of the Great Western 
which were sampled by Feinstein for his Ph. D. thesis, “Home and Foreign Investment”.  
The evidence presented there is indicative of a highly-dispersed shareholding in 1900 
with the Postmaster General having the largest percentage (1.5) of the shares, the 
Prudential holding 0.1%, all insurance companies and banks together holding 0.3% 
and the directors holding less than 1.5%.  There were no larger shareholdings so this 
would be a ‘managerially-controlled’ rather than an ‘owner-controlled’ company on 
standard criteria, see Short, “Ownership”.  Feinstein suggests that the Great Western is 
probably representative of railway companies in general. 
12 Arnold, “Profitability”. 
13 Green and Haskel, “Seeking a Premier League Economy”. 
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Vale).  Some lines were dominated by passengers – the South Eastern 
took three-quarters of its receipts from passenger operations, whereas 
others were primarily freight operations – three-quarters of the Taff Vale’s 
receipts came from freight, and almost two-thirds from minerals alone. 
Others were much more balanced operations: the Great Western’s 
revenues were split almost equally between passengers and freight, while 
the North Eastern’s came almost equally from passengers, merchandise 
and minerals. The full set of descriptive statistics is given in Table 1a, 
while the broad areas of operation are set out in Table 1b.14 
This paper offers an appraisal of management performance in 
major railway companies in Britain prior to World War I.  In the light of the 
preceding discussion, this is provided on the basis of explicit 
quantification in terms of rates of return, total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth, cost inefficiency and an important aspect of the quality of service, 
namely, improvements in the speed at which passengers could travel. 
 
 
I 
This section considers the profitability of railway companies in 
terms of rate of return on capital employed based on unpublished 
estimates made by Brian Mitchell.  In Table 2, which reports these 
figures, the companies are listed in rank order of profitability in 1910 
where the Taff Vale is at the top of the league and South East & Chatham 
at the bottom.  In general, profitability was a bit lower in 1910 than in 
1892, with the median rate of return on capital employed being 4.59 and 
4.68% respectively. Only two companies, the North Eastern and the Taff 
                                                 
14 The sample of companies in Table 1a is used for the analysis of the rest of the paper 
and is identical to that in Dodgson, “Railway Cost Functions”.  The sample includes the 
13 largest companies in Britain measured by train-miles plus the Taff Vale (23rd) and 
the criterion for inclusion is that there is a full set of information in the Railway Returns 
including cost shares. 
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Vale saw their rate of return on capital employed increase more than 
slightly over the period as a whole, in each case by about 0.3%.  The 
North Eastern Railway Company performed well and it was ranked 2nd in 
1910, a rise of 4 places since 1892. However, rates of return even of the 
top companies were low relative to other sectors.  The data reported by 
Arnold for a sample of companies across the rest of the economy in 
1899-1912 show an average rate of return on capital employed of 7.83% 
with the lowest sector, shipping, achieving 5.11%.15 
The disappointing profitability of railway companies at this time was 
also bad news for shareholders.  Although dividends continued to be paid 
in almost all cases and companies survived, railway shareholders 
generally experienced substantial capital losses as markets became less 
optimistic about railway prospects.  Total holding returns were negative 
for 10 of these 14 companies between 1898 and 1913, for which period 
Kennedy and Delargy reported an average rate of growth of returns to 
shareholders of -1.39% per year for the railway sector.16  A recent paper 
that investigated optimal diversification strategies using modern portfolio 
theory concluded that railway equities were best not held at all.17 
Writers who take a charitable view of railway management offer two 
arguments in their defence.  First, they have pointed to substantial 
improvements in operating efficiency after 1900, especially in terms of 
freight operations, and it should be noted from Table 2 that median 
profitability did recover slightly between 1900 and 1910.  Second, they 
have pointed to constraints in terms of the expectations of levels of 
service that management had to meet in the presence of threats of 
regulation which precluded a ruthless profit-maximizing approach to 
                                                 
15 Arnold, “Profitability”, Tables 3 and 4. 
16 Kennedy and Delargy, “Explaining Victorian Entrepreneurship”, Table 11a.  The 
companies with positive growth of returns were Great Western, Midland, North British 
and Taff Vale. 
17 Goetzmann and Ukhov, “British Investment”. 
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running railway businesses.18 The difference between these points of 
view indicates that the evidence on profitability in Table 2 needs to be 
reviewed in the context of cost inefficiency and quality of service. 
 
 
II 
This section looks at railway companies' performance in terms of 
cost inefficiency, i.e., the ratio of actual to minimum feasible costs.  We 
use a stochastic cost frontier approach which allows both for unobserved 
heterogeneity across the railway industry and also recognizes that railway 
companies' choices of operating methods may vary on account of 
differences in input prices and of the scale and/or density of output.  This 
allows us to quantify the 'waste and inefficiency' on the railways that Cain 
noted and also permits a calculation of how much profitability could have 
improved if inefficiency had been eliminated.19 
The standard stochastic cost frontier model for the jth firm at time t 
can be expressed as:  
 
     Cjt =  α  +  βXjt + vjt  +  ujt                                                                      (1) 
 
where Cjt is total cost, α is the intercept term, Xjt is a vector of outputs or 
inputs, β is a vector of response parameters, vjt is an idiosyncratic 
random error term, and ujt is the non-negative cost inefficiency 
component, assumed to be orthogonal to vjt. 
For our case, in which there is a high degree of operational 
heterogeneity, it is more appropriate to use the specification: 
 
                                                 
18 Notably Irving, “Profitability and Performance” but see also Cain, “Railways, 1870-
1914”. 
19 Cain, “Railways, 1870-1914”, p. 120. 
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     Cjt  =  αj  +  βXjt  +  vjt  +  ujt                                                                  (2) 
 
which has been called a 'true fixed effects' model and which allows the 
intercept term to vary across firms.20 This formulation permits a 
distinction between firm-specific heterogeneity which is taken to be 
constant and inefficiency which is allowed to be time variant. 
                                                
 
To estimate the cost-frontier model we adopt a Cobb-Douglas functional 
form with two outputs, one output quality, and three inputs with time 
dummies to allow for technical progress and year-specific shocks and 
normalized by one of the input prices to impose the theoretical 
requirement of linear homogeneity in input prices: 21 
 
     ln (Cit/Rit)  =  αi  +  βPlnPit  +  βFlnFit  +  βDlnDit  +  Στtyt  +  γKln(Kit/Rit)  +   
 
                               γLln(Lit/Rit)  +  vit  +  uit                                                (3) 
 
where C is total costs calculated as the sum of working expenditures and 
capital costs, P is passenger train-miles, F is freight ton-miles, D is 
density defined as total train miles divided by total route miles, y is a 
vector consisting of 19 year dummies from 1894 to 1912 (1893 is the 
omitted year), K is the price of capital, L is the price of labour and R is the 
price of coal.  We expect the coefficient on D to be negative and we note 
 
20 The label ‘true fixed effects’ was proposed by Greene, “Reconsidering 
Heterogeneity”. 
21 We have also experimented with the more flexible translog function. However, the 
estimated coefficients were unsatisfactory in terms of signs, magnitudes and statistical 
significance and, since on a likelihood ratio test we could not reject the more restrictive 
Cobb-Douglas specification we discarded the translog function. Similar problems have 
also been encountered by other researchers, e.g., Greene, “Reconsidering 
Heterogeneity”, who have reverted to the Cobb-Douglas specification. 
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that an inference about economies of scale can be drawn from the 
coefficients on P and F, see Appendix 1. 
Data were obtained from the Railway Returns, published annually 
by the Board of Trade, and expenditures on wages and coal prices were 
deflated using input price indices. The wage deflator was based on 
average weekly wages for 20 companies for 1898 to 1912 reported by 
Munby and Watson and a similar figure derived from the wages enquiry 
for 1891.22  For 1891 to 1898 wages were interpolated using bricklayers 
wages.23  Coal prices based on cost per ton of coal consumed in 
locomotive power were taken from files in the Public Record Office with 
estimates for Taff Vale and South Eastern being predicted using a 
regression of locomotive coal cost on fuel cost per mile.24 With respect to 
the cost of capital we used a similar approach to Farsi et al. where capital 
costs are calculated as residual costs after deducting expenditure on 
labour and coal from total costs.25  The residual costs are then divided by 
total route miles (a proxy for the capital stock) to obtain the price of 
capital.  All monetary figures were converted to 1900 prices using the 
Board of Trade wholesale price index.  
Figures 1, 2, and 3 provide an illustration of the results of the 
econometric estimation which are presented in detail in the appendix.26  
Figure 1 shows the efficient (or frontier) average cost curve in 1900 as 
passenger train miles increase holding constant freight ton miles, density 
and input prices at their average values.  The observations for individual 
companies are then plotted on the graph.  They are all above the line 
reflecting varying amounts of cost inefficiency which contribute to the 
                                                 
22 Munby and Watson, Inland Transport Statistics; Report on Wages. 
23 Taken from Report on Changes in Rates of Wages. 
24 PRO RAIL 414 595. 
25 Farsi et al., “Efficiency Measurement”. 
26 The Taff Vale is arguably an outlier in this sample so we estimated the equation with 
and without this company.  It made virtually no difference to the cost inefficiency 
estimates for the other companies. 
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overall cost inefficiency score.  Figure 2 shows the analogous graph for 
the production of freight ton miles. Both average-cost curves are 
downward-sloping reflecting modest economies of scale across most of 
the range. The differences in company size mean that some were more 
able than others to benefit from scale economies and this is taken into 
account in computing the cost inefficiency scores.  The graphs are drawn 
for a year in which cost inefficiency was quite high and many of the points 
plotted, especially in figure 1, are well above the efficient frontier.  Figure 
3 shows the impact of density (train miles per route mile) on average 
costs.  Clearly, there were economies of density and some companies 
were better placed than others in this regard. 
Cost inefficiency scores derived from the estimation of equation (3) 
are presented in Table 3.27  The entry for North Eastern in 1893-95 
means that actual costs were 14.2 per cent greater than minimum 
feasible costs and the rest of the table is read in similar fashion. As a 
check that the cost inefficiency scores obtained by this methodology do 
not simply reflect the heterogeneity of railway operations across 
companies in terms of the size or composition of their output, rank 
correlation coefficients for cost inefficiency and total revenue and for cost 
inefficiency and share of passenger revenue were calculated. The results 
were rank r = -0.09 and 0.43, respectively, neither of which is significant 
at the 10 per cent level so differences in size and revenue shares do not 
account for the cost inefficiency scores. 
Table 3 reports that there was non-trivial cost inefficiency on 
Britain’s railway network.  The (un-weighted) mean cost inefficiency score 
for all companies in all years in the period 1893-1912 is 7.1 per cent.  
Cost inefficiency was generally increasing prior to 1900 and decreasing 
                                                 
27 The scores here differ from those reported in the earlier working-paper version of this 
article.  We are now using a better software package which has facilitated full 
convergence of the estimates which has resulted in an equation with better statistical 
properties. 
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thereafter. Median cost inefficiency rose from 4.2% in 1893-95 to 10.2% 
in 1899-1901 and fell back to 2.6% in 1910-12.  It is clear that cost 
inefficiency in the railway sector could become a serious detriment to 
shareholders before remedial action was taken.  For example, if costs 
had been reduced to the level implied by the cost frontier in 1900, return 
on capital employed would have risen by 30 per cent from 4.40 to 
5.74%.28 
There was a strong tendency for companies whose cost 
inefficiency levels were relatively high at the start of a period to have 
relatively large subsequent improvements.  As the following regressions 
show, this was much more pronounced after 1900. 
 
∆ Cost Inefficiency 1893-1912  =  −4.28  +  1.04 Cost Inefficiency 1893    R2  =  0.97 
                                                     (−6.44)  (19.81) 
 
∆ Cost Inefficiency 1893-1900  =  −5.55  +  0.35 Cost Inefficiency 1893    R2  =  0.33 
                                                     (−3.38)    (2.73) 
 
∆ Cost Inefficiency 1900-1912  =  -4.85  +  1.08 Cost Inefficiency 1900    R2  =  0.96 
                                                     (-5.66)  (16.85) 
 
(In these regressions a move to lower cost inefficiency is measured as a 
positive change).  A comparison of the regressions for pre-and post-1900 
suggests much greater pressure on management to reduce cost 
inefficiency after this date; in the former period cost inefficiency is only 
predicted to improve if it started above 15.9% (5.55/0.35) whereas in the 
latter period the cut-off was much tighter at 4.5% (4.85/1.08). 
                                                 
28 This calculation applies the median cost inefficiency score of 10.2% to working 
expenditure for the sector to see how much could have been saved and then adds that 
amount to net revenue.  The amount of capital is also reduced by 10.2%.  The adjusted 
rate of return takes account of both these components. 
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The North Eastern had the lowest cost inefficiency score at the end 
of the period, although there was little to choose between it and several 
other companies.  The North Eastern’s cost inefficiency score of 1.8% 
represented a big improvement on 16.4% in 1899-1901, when it ranked 
13/14, as it had in 1893-5.  This is consistent with the account in Irving.29  
Over the whole period, the Taff Vale was an even more outstanding case 
of improvement in cost inefficiency with a reduction from 36.3% in 1893-
95 to 2.6% in 1910-12. 
The estimates in Table 3 support the views of Cain and Irving that 
railway management acted to improve operating efficiency after 1900 
when profits were in danger of falling to levels that would have provoked 
serious shareholder unrest.  The trigger may have been the realization 
after a court case in 1899 that the 1894 Railway and Canal Traffic Act 
meant that freight prices could not be increased even though the long 
price deflation was over and costs were increasing.30  Railway wages 
rose by 13.6% between 1898 and 1912.31 
Overall, the picture is that shareholders and/or customers lost out 
in the short and medium term because railway managers did not always 
take prompt advantage of opportunities to reduce costs.  The point is that, 
although the scope for managerial failure was limited, it was by no means 
trivial especially prior to 1900.  The evidence seems more consistent with 
management having to meet a satisfactory profit constraint than that they 
were forced always to maximize profits.  This would imply that cost-
reducing innovations were not necessarily adopted as soon as they 
                                                 
29 Irving, The North Eastern Railway. 
30 Irving notes that between 1899 and 1912 there was a big increase in receipts per 
freight train mile in nearly all companies as loadings improved on Britain’s railways, 
ibid., p. 281. 
31 Munby and Watson, Inland Transport Statistics, p. 57. 
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should have been unless profits were near the constraint level.32  The 
freezing of freight charges amounted to a crude version of RPI – X 
regulation and the evidence suggests that it worked to some extent.  
Nevertheless, effective competition would no doubt have been a much 
better discipline on management. 
 
 
III 
We now consider the comparative performance of the major railway 
companies in terms of total factor productivity growth which is computed 
in the conventional manner as the rate of growth of output minus the rate 
of growth of total factor inputs 
 
     TFP growth = ∑μjlogΔYj - ∑αilogΔXi                                                       
(4) 
 
where Yj is an output, μj is the revenue share of the jth output, Xi is an 
input and αi is the elasticity of output with respect to the ith input assumed 
as usual to equal its share in costs.33 
The data with which to implement this formula were primarily taken 
from the Railway Returns.  With respect to output for each company there 
are data on passenger train-miles, merchandise tons, mineral tons, and 
revenue from each of the three types of output.  Unfortunately, the 
Railway Returns do not provide data on passenger miles or ton miles but 
                                                 
32 Aghion et al., “Corporate Governance”, develop a model of innovation of this kind 
based on the assumption that innovation entails effort, and therefore disutility, on the 
part of managers. 
33 If returns to scale are not constant then this formula leads to a residual which is a 
mixture of TFP growth and scale economies.  The degree of scale economies that we 
find in our estimated cost function suggest that this is not a serious issue, as Dodgson, 
“Railway Cost Functions” also found.  In any event, this is not a major concern here 
because we are not seeking to identify the rate of technological progress.  Any 
improvement in TFP, whatever its source, offers potential benefits to transport users. 
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we have been able to construct estimates of the latter.  Thus, output has 
been measured as the revenue share-weighted aggregate of passenger 
traffic measured by passenger train-miles, mineral freight ton-miles and 
merchandise freight ton-miles using the weights for each company 
reported in Table 1a. 
For the freight output measures we have approximated ton-miles 
from revenue using constant prices of 0.7d per ton-mile and 2.0d per ton-
mile for minerals and merchandise, respectively.  These are 
representative prices for the early twentieth century according to Paish.13  
Econometric analysis reported by Crafts et al. shows that the hypothesis 
that these were representative charges throughout 1881 to 1915 cannot 
be rejected.14  It is well-known that charges were capped by regulation 
after 1894 and in the case of the North Eastern which published detailed 
statistics, charges fell after 1900 but only very marginally.15  In the 
circumstances, it seems clear that growth of nominal revenue is a good 
measure of growth of real freight output during 1892 to 1912. 
With respect to inputs we take account of capital, labour and coal 
which are given weights of 0.59, 0.34 and 0.07, respectively, these being 
the average cost shares for Britain's railways in 1902.34  Capital inputs 
have been approximated using total track-miles from the Railway 
Returns.16  The same source provides annual data on expenditures on 
wages and coal which can be deflated using input price indices to 
estimate use of labour and coal inputs, as above.   
Table 4 reports TFP growth rates for 14 major railway companies 
for the period 1893-1912 as well as for the sub-periods, 1893-1900 and 
1900-1912. Two things stand out. First, performance falls sharply, from 
an average of 1.8% 1893-1900 to just 0.6% 1900-1912, with twelve of the 
                                                 
34 Using common factor-share weights is standard practice in benchmarking exercises 
of this type and is imposing the assumption that output elasticities are common.  As it 
happens, these railways have very similar cost shares so it would make no material 
difference if individual company weights had been used. 
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fourteen companies seeing TFP growth fall. Second, the range of 
performance is significant, particularly after 1900, when the co-efficient of 
variation increases to 0.88. At the top of the table are the Taff Vale and 
Great Central. The Taff Vale turns in a consistently good performance of 
1.6% and 1.7% in each period, while the Great Central records 
remarkable TFP growth of 3.0% between 1893-1900, by far the highest 
value of any company in any period, followed by lacklustre TFP growth of 
0.7% in the subsequent period. This is partly an artefact of railway output 
being measured as ton miles (and passenger train miles). Goods have to 
be loaded, transported, and unloaded, with the loading and unloading 
costs independent of distance travelled. As such, a company with longer 
runs will generally have higher measured TFP, since only the transporting 
cost element rises with distance. This is one reason why it is not 
meaningful to compare TFP levels across companies whose haul lengths 
may differ. The Great Central’s 92 mile London extension opened in 
1899. Although data on average haul distances do not exist, it is likely 
that the Great Central’s average haul distance increased in this period, 
leading to an increase in measured TFP growth, even in the absence of 
any improvements in TFP for any previous journey. 
TFP growth and changes in cost inefficiency across these companies are 
correlated: 
 
  TFP Growth 1893-1912  =  0.95  +  2.10 ∆ Cost Inefficiency 1893-1912      R2  =  0.27 
                                            (9.90)     (2.40) 
 
TFP growth clearly depends on a large number of factors, including 
technological progress reflects opportunities to exploit scale and density 
economies as well as improvements in cost control. Nevertheless, it is not 
surprising to find that improvements in cost-inefficiency are statistically 
significant at the 5% level when trying to explain TFP growth, and that 
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they explain about a quarter of the observed TFP growth for this sample 
of countries. 
In contrast there is no correlation between TFP growth and 
changes in the rate of return on capital employed: 
 
     ∆ ROCE 1892-1910  =  -0.14  +  0.05 TFP Growth 1893-1912                 R2  =  -0.08 
                                          (0.44)    (0.15) 
 
At first sight this is surprising. Given that railways have market power, we 
would expect that the benefits of TFP growth would result in higher 
returns for shareholders. In reality the lack of relationship most likely 
reflects the range of factors that influence the rate of return on capital 
employed, so that it is difficult to construct a test for which the “ceteris 
paribus” condition holds. 
Clearly, companies which start at a low level of TFP will, ceteris 
paribus, have more scope for TFP growth from catch-up and to evaluate 
performance it would seem desirable to take this into account.  Estimating 
levels of TFP is, however, more problematic than computing growth rates 
of TFP.  The difficulty lies in making comparisons of freight output since it 
is not correct to assume either that charges per ton-mile or that average 
haul lengths were identical across companies or over time.  Few of the 
necessary data are available; for example, the Railway Returns do not 
report average haul length at company level until 1920.  We have 
therefore chosen not to normalize TFP growth by the initial TFP level.  
This may be sensible in any case because of the substantial 
heterogeneity in the networks operated by the companies. 
The TFP growth performance reported in Table 4 supports the 
conclusion reached by Dodgson in an earlier exercise of a similar kind, 
namely, that there would have been a marked improvement in 
productivity performance on the railways if all companies had achieved 
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similar TFP growth to that of the best and that there may have been 
market failure that may have required regulatory intervention.35  
 
IV 
Subject to reasonable safety standards, speed is the most 
important aspect of railway quality for passengers. The benefits of 
increased speed can, at first approximation, be captured by the wage 
rates of those who travel, with adjustments made for leisure travel. The 
magnitude of these benefits has been found to be large for both the US 
and the UK in the nineteenth century.36 In contrast, excepting perishable 
goods, the speed of goods trains are unimportant: the carrying cost of 
extra inventory caused by slower trains would be trivially small. The 
questions in this section, then, are straightforward: who ran the fastest 
trains, and whose trains improved most in terms of speed, in both cases 
taking into account what we might reasonably expect given their 
networks?  
Bradshaw’s Railway Guide is a complete annual UK railways 
timetable for this era. Although trains may not have run perfectly to 
schedule, there is no reason to think that Bradshaw’s was more optimistic 
for one company versus another, or at one date compared with another. 
We therefore treat it as a good guide to actual train speeds.  
We exclude journeys for which no single company had complete 
responsibility. Thus, for example, no trains running from London to 
Glasgow are included, since all such journeys involved sections on which 
one company’s trains ran on the tracks of another company. In such 
circumstances it is not possible to say whether an improvement in speed 
should be assigned to the company running the train or providing the 
                                                 
35 Dodgson, “British Railway Cost Functions”, p. 176.  Dodgson’s calculations of railway 
TFP indices are for a shorter period (1900-1912) than ours and measure freight output 
growth in terms of train-miles rather than ton-miles. 
36 Boyd and Walton, “Social Savings” and Leunig, “Time is Money”. 
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track. Speeds are measured from the beginning to end of the journey, 
and include station stops en-route, but exclude any initial waiting time for 
the train. Including initial waiting times has been shown to have little 
effect on changes in overall speeds in the nineteenth century, with 
increased frequencies matching increased track speeds.37 
Railway companies often advertised the speeds of their trains, 
concentrating on long distance express trains. However, it is important to 
remember that not all trains were long distance expresses.38 In order to 
capture the full range of services, two distinct samples were constructed. 
The first consists of every train on the most important 47 routes, defined 
by the likely traffic on them. This is measured by the product of the 
population in each place, divided by the distance between them (with a 
minimum distance of 10km). Increasing population increases the number 
travelling, but increasing distance reduces the number, because it raises 
the cost of travel. This is, in effect, a gravity equation. The major-journeys 
sample includes not only intercity pairs such as London-Birmingham, but 
also shorter inter-urban journeys such as Manchester-Oldham. In 
essence, what we are measuring here is the company’s ability to provide 
a fast service on routes with high levels of demand. The sample consists 
of the journey times of 916 trains in 1887 and 1619 trains in 1910. The 
numbers vary dramatically by company; neither the North Eastern or Taff 
Vale had any major routes, the North British had one, and three other 
companies had two. At the other end of the scale, the Great Western had 
ten and the London & North Western had nineteen. Where a company 
had more than one such route within its area, average speed was taken 
to be the weighted average of the speeds on different routes, using the 
likely traffic on each route as weights. That the number of routes is 
distributed asymmetrically is inevitable given the use of standardised 
                                                 
37 See Leunig, “Time is Money”, Tables 2 and 4. 
38 See the discussion in ibid.. 
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criteria for all companies: some areas simply had a larger number of 
important journeys within them. Ensuring a common sample size across 
all areas by changing the criteria by area would result in a biased sample, 
in which unimportant journeys would qualify for inclusion in some regions 
but not others.  
The second sample consists of a set of minor journeys within each 
company’s region. This was constructed by recording the first train 
arriving after 7am at each town in Britain with a population of over 12,500 
in 1901. These journeys are comparable, therefore, in that each is a 
service to a place of similar size. In total we computerised the times for 
246 journeys in 1887 and 257 journeys in 1910. Nevertheless, taking the 
first train arriving after 7am means that the place from which the train 
originates can vary considerably, and this might affect the average speed. 
It is thus important to ensure that each company has a reasonable 
sample size: otherwise a company with few towns of 12,500 might end up 
with a minor journey sample too small to be representative. In order to 
prevent this, where a company had fewer than 10 qualifying towns, 
subsequent trains into each place were included to ensure a minimum 
sample size of 10 for each company. The minor journey speeds exhibit 
lower standard deviations and coefficients of variance in each year than 
the major journeys, and the companies with smaller sample sizes are not 
distributed at either end of the table, indicating that the sample sizes are 
sufficiently large for our purposes.  
An overall figure for speed was obtained by taking a simple 
average of the figures for major and minor routes. There are three 
reasons for using a simple average. First, a simple average is the correct 
weighting for the industry as a whole, and there is no particular reason to 
think that it would have varied by company.39 Second, it is not plausible 
to construct more accurate weights, since this would require detailed 
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knowledge of travel patterns within areas that are simply unavailable. 
Finally, the issue of weightings is very much second order: as Table 6 
shows, the top four companies had positive scores for speeds on both 
major and minor routes, the bottom five had negative speeds for both 
types of journeys, while the middle three had one positive and one 
negative score. Altering the weighting of major to minor journeys would 
thus make little difference to the overall patterns observable in Table 6.  
There was considerable dispersion in the raw speeds of trains by 
company, with speeds on the fastest company’s lines almost half as fast 
again as trains operated by slower companies, reflecting different 
opportunities. The Great Northern, Midland and London and North 
Western ran the fastest trains in both years, and – unsurprisingly – the 
Taff Vale was slowest in each year, with the south London commuter 
networks also posting poor results. The results for 1887 are in line with 
those of Foxwell and Farrer, who compare the speeds of express trains 
by company in 1888. Their methodology is different, in that they look at 
the speed of express trains, rather than the speed of trains on important 
routes, and in that they use the average speed excluding stops, rather 
than the complete journey time from one place to the next. Nevertheless, 
the top four places are the same in both cases, Great Northern, Midland, 
North-Western and Great Western respectively, giving us considerable 
confidence in our methodology.40 
Raw speeds are not a good way to compare company 
performance. Some journeys are much longer than others, and the length 
of journey is a good predictor of speed. Instead we assess companies by 
“out-performance”, the extent to which actual speeds exceeded predicted 
speeds, where predicted speeds are calculated by regressing speed on 
distance and (where significant) distance squared. Actual speeds, out-
                                                                                                                                               
39 Ibid., fn. 41. 
40 Foxwell and Farrer, Express Trains. 
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performance and sample sizes are all reported in Table 5 where 
companies are ordered by out-performance in 1910.41 
Although their raw speed numbers would place them in the bottom 
half of companies, the Caledonian and Lancashire and Yorkshire are first 
and third, respectively, as measured by out-performance, while the Great 
Northern’s trains appear to have been fast, but not as fast as expected. 
The Taff Vale, however, is slow by any measure, perhaps reflecting its 
concentration on goods traffic. It is also noteworthy that the two classic 
London commuter networks, the South Eastern and Chatham, and the 
London and South Western, are lowly ranked in both years. It appears 
that even taking into account of the average distances of their journeys, 
their trains were relatively slow. There is no correlation between out-
performance and the share of passenger traffic in total revenue: 
 
     Speed  =  -3.10   +  0.05 Passenger Revenue Share                               R2  =  -0.01 
                    (-1.08)     (0.95) 
 
Thus, it is not the case that those companies for whom passengers were 
a more important source of revenue improved speeds more effectively 
than those for whom passengers were a more minor part of their 
business model. 
The rate of improvement in this period can be identified by 
subtracting the out-performance figures for 1887 from those for 1910 with 
the results given in Table 6.  Lancashire and Yorkshire improved most 
dramatically in this period, with an increase in speed relative to 
expectations of 3.3kmph, while the North Eastern is fourth with an 
improvement of 1.6kmph. In contrast, the Great Central performed poorly, 
with average speeds falling relative to those that could legitimately have 
                                                 
41 It should be noted that this increase in speed was achieved despite a considerable 
increase in the weight of trains consequent on improved design for safety reasons. 
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been expected of it. That is not to say that the Great Central trains were 
slower in 1910 than in 1887; indeed Table 5 shows that their average 
train was 7.5kmph faster in 1910 than in 1887, the largest improvement in 
the industry. Over that period, however, the Great Central expanded its 
network substantially and therefore had significant new opportunities to 
run long distance express trains. Those opportunities do not appear to 
have been taken up to the extent that would have been possible, and 
thus, relative to the opportunities available, the Great Central can be 
judged to have performed badly. It is also worth noting that the principal 
merger in this period, that of the London Chatham and Dover with the 
South Eastern, did not result in obvious gains to passengers. Relative to 
other companies the merged company fell back compared with the 
performance of the weighted average of its two predecessors in this 
period.  
Were the improvements in performance relative to legitimate 
expectations between 1887 and 1910 predicted by the initial positions in 
1887? A regression of the improvement in actual versus predicted speed 
between 1887 and 1910 on the level of that measure in 1887 finds that 
there is no correlation at all; the coefficient on 1887 levels is not 
significant and the adjusted R2 is trivially low. There is no evidence that 
the laggards were catching up with those who were doing better, 
 
     Improvements  = -0.11 -   0.21 1887 levels                         R2 = 0.01 
   (-0.17)   (-1.06) 
 
There is a positive, though rather weak, relationship between improving 
speeds (relative to expectations) and changes in the return on capital 
employed. There is no reason to think, therefore, that profitability was 
undermined by the investments that led to faster trains, nor that investors 
in companies whose trains did not improve as much suffered financially. 
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In essence, many journeys were essentially monopolistic, and 
passengers were not able to change the company that they used 
sufficiently often for speed and profitability to be well-correlated. 
 
     ΔROCE 1892-1910  = -0.19 +   0.78 Improvements            R2 = 0.17 
    (-2.09)     (1.93) 
 
Nor is there strong evidence that some firms were constrained from 
improving speeds by low rates of return; the return on capital employed in 
1902 is positively related to the improvement in speeds in this era but the 
R2 is very low. 
 
     Improvements  = -6.92 +   1.57 1902 ROCE                         R2 = 0.15 
            (-1.80)      (1.81) 
 
 
V 
Earlier sections have reviewed four aspects of railway 
performance, namely, profitability, productivity growth, cost inefficiency 
and speed of passenger services. It turns out that no company was best 
(or worst) at everything.  The leaders were: Taff Vale for return on capital 
employed and TFP growth, North Eastern for cost inefficiency, and 
Caledonian for speed. The laggards at the foot of the table in each 
category were: South Eastern & Chatham for return on capital employed, 
Caledonian and North British for TFP growth, Great Eastern and North 
British for cost inefficiency, and Taff Vale for speed. The overall ranking is 
not therefore unambiguous, but instead depends to some extent on the 
method of aggregation.  
We offer two illustrative methods of aggregation. Table 7 reports 
rank-order positions in terms of all these various components and 
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constructs from them an aggregate ranking of company performance by 
means of the Borda Score. Table 8 reports a distance indicator, where 
the performance of the worst company in each category is given a value 
of 0 and the best a value of 1, and intermediate companies are assigned 
a mark based on their distance from the best and worst companies. The 
former measure has the disadvantage of taking no account of how much 
better a company is than its rivals; and neither measure gives any weight 
to the possibility that in some dimensions even the best company may be 
quite poor relative to what could have been achieved. The biggest 
differences occur when the majority of companies are clustered towards 
one end of the distribution. Thus, for example, Taff Vale is ranked only 8th 
on cost inefficiency, but its cost-inefficiency score is 84% of the best 
attained. 
Despite potential differences, both measures present a very similar 
picture and the rank correlation between the rankings in Tables 7 and 8 is 
0.9. The London and North Western is top on both rankings, albeit jointly 
with the North Eastern using Borda scores and these companies together 
with the Great Western, Midland and Taff Vale comprise the top five in 
each case. The North British and South Eastern and Chatham occupy the 
bottom two places in each table. On this evidence, the North Eastern 
does deserve the praise accorded to it in the historiography, albeit as one 
of a number of relatively well-run railways, while the Great Central’s 
appalling return on capital employed did not imply equally bad 
performance across all performance measures.  
It is worth noting that the Great Central was the most expansionist 
railway of this time and that the South Eastern & Chatham was the 
largest merger.  In neither case do these initiatives appear to have 
generated particularly good outcomes for shareholders or customers, but 
rather represent empire-building by managers in a context of the 
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separation of ownership and control.  This would not be a great surprise 
to anyone familiar with the modern industrial economics literature.42 
VI 
At the outset we suggested that TFP growth was a very important 
criterion of company performance.  In this respect, it seems clear that 
TFP growth on British railways could have been faster in the pre-World 
War I period.  TFP growth varied markedly across companies, some of 
which were persistent laggards, and average TFP growth at 1.05 per cent 
per year during 1893-1912 was exactly half that achieved by American 
railways between 1890 and 1910.43  By 1910, labour productivity on 
American railways was 3.30 times the British level up from a ratio of 1.65 
in 1870 and 2.93 in 1890, a gap which underlines the doubts about the 
productivity performance of British railways.44  The railway sector 
admirably illustrates Broadberry’s thesis about the central role of 
‘industrialized services’ in British relative economic decline.  
The railway sector operated behind massive barriers to entry and 
collusive behaviour was rampant.45  Indeed in the early twentieth century 
railway companies operated agreements that amounted almost to de 
facto amalgamation (for example, Great Central, Great Eastern, Great 
Northern or Lancashire & Yorkshire, London & North Western and 
Midland) while devoting a good deal of management effort to lobbying 
government to allow mergers.46  Railway management generally had 
considerable opportunity to pursue their own objectives while neglecting 
                                                 
42 For example, Mueller, Corporation, p. 184, reports the results of a large-scale study 
that only 29 per cent of mergers lead to increased efficiency and he concludes from a 
comprehensive survey that the evidence is that, on average, mergers reduce 
profitability. 
43 Fishlow, “Productivity and Technological Change”, Table 10.  This is not to say that 
British railways could have matched their American counterparts given the different 
geographic conditions and network legacies.  But it is a worrying diagnostic. 
44 Crafts et al., “Total Factor Productivity Growth”, Table 1. 
45 Cain, “Railway Combination”. 
46 Cain, “Railways, 1870-1914”, pp. 118-9. 
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productivity improvement in a context where shareholders were weak and 
takeover threats non-existent. 
Competition is the antidote to such principal-agent problems as the 
modern literature on recent British company performance highlights.47  
Competition alerts shareholders to under-performance and allows better 
incentives in managerial contracts.  The weakness of competition in the 
railway sector contrasts sharply with the situation in the internationally-
traded goods sector where the neoclassical exoneration of British 
entrepreneurship found most of its examples.  The general argument put 
forward by McCloskey and Sandberg was that that competition punished 
firms whose management did not perform well.48  However, this plainly 
did not apply to railways for which competitive pressures were weak and 
whose management was poor.  
If competition does not put adequate pressure on management to 
perform, then regulation is a possible alternative.  It has been argued that 
the freight-price controls that ensued from the 1894 Act promoted 
productivity improvement as management responded to the threat to 
profits.49  The evidence of Table 3, which showed that a slide into cost 
inefficiency was reversed after 1900, suggests that this is plausible.  So, 
more effective regulation might have made a difference by giving 
management stronger incentives to raise TFP growth.  Aspects of the 
modern regulation of privatized activities such as yardstick competition, 
RPI – X price capping and competitive bidding for franchises could surely 
have put much stronger pressure on management to improve productivity 
performance, especially with regard to the tail of consistently-poor 
                                                 
47 Nickell et al., “What Makes Firms”, and Bloom and van Reenen, “Measuring and 
Explaining”. 
48 McLoskey and Sandberg, “From Damnation to Redemption”. 
49 Cain, “Railways, 1870-1914”.  It should be noted that this amounts to a suggestion 
that management only adopted cost-reducing innovations when they were taken out of 
the comfort zone.  This underlines a diagnosis of principal-agent problems arising from 
separation of ownership and control. 
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performers.  In any event, the performance of the railway companies 
immediately prior to World War I strongly suggest that private ownership 
per se is not the key to efficient operation but that it needs to be 
complemented by effective regulation where competition is weak.  This is 
entirely consistent with the British experience of privatizations in the 
1980s and 1990s and is as economic theory would predict.50 
 
 
VII 
 The conclusions of our quantitative investigation are as follows. 
First, the rates of return achieved by all British railway companies 
prior to World War I were disappointing and were undermined by cost 
inefficiency and weak TFP growth rather than improvements in the quality 
of services.  Second, cost inefficiency was substantial in the late 
nineteenth century but improved markedly thereafter.  Third, TFP growth 
was generally disappointing and there were substantial and persistent 
discrepancies in performance across companies.  Fourth, similarly, there 
were big differences in the speed of passenger services across 
companies with a tail of consistently poor performers.  Fifth, the North 
Eastern Railway deserves its position in the literature as the best-
managed railway company and was the top performer in cost inefficiency 
and TFP growth. 
Taken together, these results suggest that British railway 
companies were generally not very well-managed one hundred years 
ago.  In particular, mediocre management and a tail of poor performers 
could persist in an industry where neither competition nor regulation was 
very effective.  The new economic historians’ exoneration of British 
management does not seem valid for railways; in this industry late-
                                                 
50 See, for example, Parker, “UK’s Privatization Experiment”.  The theoretical analysis 
was very clearly set out in Vickers and Yarrow, Privatization. 
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Victorian Britain did fail.  Further investigation of the quality of 
management in other sectors where the discipline of exposure to 
international competition was absent seems desirable. 
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Freight ton miles - cost relationship, Britain's railways (1900)
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Density - cost relationship, Britain's railways (1900)
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Table 1a. Descriptive Statistics for Principal British Railway Companies, annual average 1893-1912 
Railway company 
Total 
route 
mile
s 
Total 
train 
mile
s 
Density 
(train 
miles 
per 
route 
mile) 
Total 
receipt
s 
Passenge
r receipts 
relative to 
total 
receipts 
Merchandise 
receipts 
relative to total 
receipts 
Mineral  
receipts 
relative to 
total receipts
  (m)  (£m) % % % 
Caledonian 1000 16.5 16540 4.1 41% 28% 30% 
Great Central 547 13.6 24911 3.3 30% 31% 39% 
Great Eastern 1119 21.0 18738 5.0 57% 28% 14% 
Great Northern 835 22.2 26657 5.1 43% 33% 25% 
Great Western 2731 46.2 16899 11.3 49% 25% 26% 
Lancashire & Yorkshire 564 17.8 31566 5.3 43% 35% 22% 
London & North Western 1935 46.4 23994 13.6 44% 34% 22% 
London & South Western 924 17.8 19256 4.4 70% 21% 9% 
London, Brighton & South 
Coast 448 11.0 24560 3.0 74% 15% 11% 
Midland  1466 46.4 31612 11.0 33% 34% 33% 
North British 1281 17.6 13743 4.2 39% 29% 32% 
North Eastern 1669 29.2 17526 8.8 33% 33% 34% 
South Eastern & Chatham 561 13.0 23134 3.8 75% 16% 9% 
Taff Vale 123 2.4 19480 0.8 25% 10% 65% 
 
Notes:  Great Central was Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire until 1897. 
London, Chatham & Dover included in South Eastern after 1899. 
Source: Railway Returns
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Table 1b. Principal Areas of Operation 
 
Railway company Areas of operation 
Caledonian Carlisle to Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen 
Great Central 
London to the East Midlands, Manchester and 
Sheffield 
Great Eastern London to East Anglia 
Great Northern London to Doncaster, Leeds and Bradford 
Great Western 
London to South West, Wales, West Midlands 
& Birkenhead 
Lancashire & Yorkshire Liverpool and Manchester to Goole 
London & North Western 
London to the West Midlands, North Wales and 
Carlisle 
London & South Western London to the South West of England 
London, Brighton & South 
Coast 
London to the South Coast from Portsmouth to 
Hastings 
Midland 
London to E. Midlands, Carlisle, Yorkshire; 
Derby to Bristol 
North British 
Edinburgh to Berwick, Carlisle, Glasgow, and 
Dundee 
North Eastern The region between Hull, York and Edinburgh 
South Eastern & Chatham South East from London 
Taff Vale Cardiff and the Rhondda Valley 
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Table 2.  Rate of Return on Capital Employed (%) 
 
 1892 1900 1910 
    
Taff Vale 5.93 5.57 6.24 
North Eastern 4.92 4.75 5.21 
London & North Western 5.17 5.06 5.11 
Great Western 4.64 4.44 4.73 
London & South Western 5.05 4.94 4.73 
London Brighton & South Coast 5.31 4.91 4.72 
Midland 5.03 4.78 4.69 
Great Northern 4.72 4.35 4.49 
North British 4.12 4.55 4.29 
Great Eastern 3.96 4.24 3.97 
Lancashire & Yorkshire 4.04 3.99 3.97 
Caledonian 4.14 4.22 3.89 
Great Central 4.41 3.09 3.67 
South Eastern & Chatham 4.53 3.75 3.59 
 
Source: data generously provided by Brian Mitchell.  The rates of return are calculated 
using net traffic revenue relative to paid-up capital on all lines worked and are 5 year 
averages.  Net revenue was taken from Railway Returns and paid-up capital from half-
yearly company accounts held at the time when the data were extracted (1962/3) in the 
British Transport Commission Historical Archives in London, Edinburgh and York. 
 
Table 3.  Cost Inefficiency Scores, 1893-1912 
 
 1893-95 1899-1901 1910-12 
    
North Eastern 0.142 0.164 0.018 
Great Western 0.131 0.155 0.019 
Great Northern 0.034 0.108 0.020 
London & North Western 0.098 0.126 0.020 
Great Central 0.132 0.150 0.021 
Midland 0.042 0.110 0.021 
London & South Western 0.041 0.054 0.025 
Taff Vale 0.363 0.287 0.026 
Lancashire & Yorkshire 0.027 0.043 0.036 
South Eastern & Chatham 0.031 0.037 0.037 
Caledonian 0.084 0.037 0.053 
London, Brighton & South Coast 0.033 0.088 0.059 
Great Eastern 0.014 0.094 0.068 
North British 0.029 0.039 0.068 
 
Source: authors' calculations, see text. 
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Table 4.  Total Factor Productivity Growth, 1893-1912 (%  per year) 
 
 1893-1912 1893-1900 1900-1912 
    
Taff Vale 1.6 1.6 1.7 
Great Central 1.5 3.0 0.7 
Great Eastern 1.2 1.9 0.9 
London Brighton & South Coast 1.2 0.9 1.4 
Midland 1.2 2.3 0.5 
North Eastern 1.2 2.1 0.7 
Great Western 1.1 1.7 0.8 
London and North Western 1.1 1.6 0.9 
London and South Western 1.1 2.1 0.6 
Great Northern 1.1 2.4 0.3 
South Eastern & Chatham 0.9 1.6 0.5 
Lancashire & Yorkshire 0.6 1.7 0.0 
North British 0.4 1.0 0.0 
Caledonian 0.4 1.6 -0.3 
 
Source: authors' calculations, see text. 
Table 5. The Speed of Passenger Trains in 1887 and 1910 
 
 1887 1887 1887  1910 1910 1910 
 major minor average  major minor average 
Caledonian 41.4 30.4 35.9  41.0 30.6 35.8 
 8.1 0.4 4.2  7.7 0.1 3.9 
 (2/31) (10) (12/41)  (2/43) (16) (18/59) 
London & North Western 52.0 31.9 42.0  57.5 33.1 45.3 
 1.2 1.5 1.4  4.7 2.2 3.4 
 (19/279) (48) (67/327)  (16/470) (51) (67/521) 
Lancashire & Yorkshire 34.3 28.4 31.4  37.7 32.4 35.0 
 -0.9 0.0 -0.4  2.2 3.5 2.8 
 (8/156) (13) (21/169)  (8/237) (13) (21/250) 
Midland 53.9 27.8 40.9  56.6 36.2 46.4 
 2.1 -1.1 0.5  1.3 2.6 2.0 
 (8/83) (16) (24/99)  (9/170) (17) (26/187) 
Great Eastern 45.2 33.1 39.2  46.7 39.2 43.0 
 -0.1 2.5 1.2  -2.7 5.5 1.4 
 (4/58) (11) (15/69)  (4/68) (11) (15/79) 
Great Western 45.6 30.2 37.9  53.3 33.5 43.4 
 -3.8 -0.1 -2.0  -0.4 1.5 0.6 
 (10/95) (39) (49/134)  (12/201) (35) (47/236) 
North British 40.4 34.7 37.6  41.2 32.1 36.6 
 2.0 4.2 3.1  2.7 -1.9 0.4 
 (1/10) (11) (12/21)  (1/26) (11) (12/37) 
North Eastern  29.4 29.4   33.1 33.1 
  -1.2 -1.2   0.4 0.4 
  (17) (17/17)   (21) (21/21) 
London, Brighton & South 
Coast 40.4 31.1 35.8  42.7 34.4 38.6 
 0.9 -1.9 -0.5  -0.5 -0.1 -0.3 
 (2/29) (16) (18/45)  (2/54) (14) (16/68) 
Great Northern 57.8 31.4 44.6  54.2 35.9 45.0 
 5.7 -0.7 2.5  -1.4 -0.8 -1.1 
 (5/34) (20) (25/54)  (5/129) (17) (22/146) 
Great Central 35.8 27.2 31.5  51.5 26.4 39.0 
 0.0 -0.2 -0.1  -4.0 -4.0 -4.0 
 (2/21) (10) (12/31)  (7/61) (12) (19/73) 
London & South Western 37.6 30.0 33.8  41.2 36.6 38.9 
 -8.5 -2.7 -5.6  -7.9 -0.8 -4.4 
 (3/44) (14) (17/58)  (3/54) (16) (19/70) 
South Eastern & Chatham 34.4 29.7 32.0  34.3 30.0 32.2 
 -3.9 -1.5 -2.7  -5.6 -5.4 -5.5 
 (7/76) (11) (18/87)  (4/106) (13) (13/13) 
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Taff Vale  20.2 20.2   21.5 21.5 
  -7.7 -7.7   -6.9 -6.9 
  (10) (10/10)   (10) (10/10) 
 
Notes: For each company: 
Row 1: speed in kilometres per hour 
Row 2: outperformance: actual speed minus predicted speeds, see text 
Row 3: sample size, number of routes/number of journeys 
Great Central was MSL in 1887, South Eastern & Chatham is the weighted average of 
South Eastern and London, Chatham & Dover in 1887. 
Source: authors’ calculations from Bradshaw’s Railway Guide
 Table 6. Improvements in Actual-Predicted Speeds, 1887 to 1910 
 
 major minor 
averag
e 
    
Lancashire and Yorkshire 3.1 3.5 3.3 
Great Western 3.4 1.6 2.5 
London and North Western 3.5 0.7 2.1 
North Eastern  1.6 1.6 
Midland -0.8 3.7 1.4 
London and South Western 0.6 1.9 1.2 
Taff Vale  0.8 0.8 
Great Eastern -2.6 3.0 0.2 
London Brighton and South 
Coast -1.4 1.8 0.2 
Caledonian -0.4 -0.3 -0.4 
North British 0.7 -6.1 -2.7 
South Eastern and Chatham -1.7 -3.9 -2.8 
Great Northern -7.1 -0.1 -3.6 
Great Central -4.0 -3.8 -3.9 
 
Notes: all speeds are measured in kilometres per hour. 
Source: authors’ calculations from Table 6. 
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Table 7.  End-Period Borda Scores 
 
Railway company Return 
on 
capital 
TFP 
growth 
1893-1912 
Cost 
inefficiency 
Speed Borda 
score 
      
North Eastern 2 6 1 7.5 16.5 
London & North Western 3 8 3.5 2 16.5 
Great Western 4.5 7 2 6 19.5 
Midland 7 5 5.5 4 21.5 
Taff Vale 1 1 8 14 24 
London Brighton & SC 6 4 12 9 31 
Great Northern 8 10 3.5 10 31.5 
Great Central 13 2 5.5 11 31.5 
Great Eastern 10.5 3 13.5 5 32 
London & South Western 4.5 9 7 12 32.5 
Lancashire & Yorkshire 10.5 12 9 3 34.5 
Caledonian 12 14 11 1 38 
North British 9 13 13.5 7.5 43 
South Eastern & Chatham 14 11 10 13 48 
 
Note: scores in the first four columns are ranks from best (1) to worst (14) taken from 
tables 2, 3, 4, and 6.  The Borda Score in column 5 is obtained by summing the 
rankings in columns 1 to 4 and the lowest number is best. 
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Table 8.  End-Period Aggregate Scores: Relative Performance between 
Best and Worst 
 
Recalculated with 
new TFP 
ROCE TFP 
growth 
1893-
1912 
Cost 
inefficiency 
Speeds Total 
      
London & North 
Western 
0.57 0.60 0.96 0.95 3.09 
North Eastern 0.61 0.64 1.00 0.68 2.93 
Taff Vale 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.00 2.84 
Midland 0.42 0.59 0.94 0.82 2.77 
Great Western 0.43 0.60 0.98 0.69 2.70 
Great Northern 0.34 0.66 0.96 0.54 2.49 
Great Central 0.03 0.93 0.94 0.27 2.17 
Caledonian 0.11 0.69 0.30 1.00 2.10 
London Brighton & 
SC 
0.43 0.69 0.18 0.61 1.90 
Lancashire & 
Yorkshire 
0.14 0.18 0.64 0.91 1.88 
London & South 
Western 
0.43 0.00 0.86 0.24 1.53 
Great Eastern 0.14 0.58 0.00 0.77 1.49 
South Eastern & 
Chatham 
0.00 0.41 0.62 0.13 1.16 
North British 0.26 0.01 0.00 0.68 0.95 
 
Note: in each of the constituent columns the company placed first in each of the 
individual measures given in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 6 is assigned a value of 1, whilst the 
company placed last is given a value of 0. Other companies are assigned a value equal 
to their performance relative to this interval: thus the North Eastern's ROCE out-
performs the worst company by 61 per cent of the best company's out-performance.  
The aggregate score in column 5 is the sum of the scores for individual categories 
(maximum = 4).
Appendix Table 1. Regression Results of the Cost Frontier Model, 1893-1912  
 
Coefficient Estimate t-ratio 
Pβ  0.6658 156.44 
Fβ  0.2638 167.80 
Dβ  -0.4793 -103.91 
Kγ  0.2194 44.05 
Lγ  0.6285 124.65 
1894τ  0.0933 38.97 
1895τ  0.0930 13.71 
1896τ  0.0926 33.20 
1897τ  0.0889 22.59 
1898τ  0.0659 5.06 
1899τ  0.0811 27.38 
1900τ  0.0216 6.57 
1901τ  -0.0013 -0.07 
1902τ  0.0018 0.14 
1903τ  0.0190 1.32 
1904τ  -0.0066 -0.16 
1905τ  0.0041 0.20 
1906τ  0.0008 0.02 
1907τ  -0.0005 -0.05 
1908τ  -0.0007 -0.23 
1909τ  -0.0004 -0.14 
1910τ  -0.0003 -0.11 
1911τ  -0.0003 -0.09 
1912τ  -0.0002 -0.08 
iα  Not shown  
Observations     280  
Log-Likelihood function    
22
vu σσσ +=                      0.156 172.56 
22
vu σσλ =                          16.372 14.54 
 
 
the estimate is −2.09, implying strongly increasing returns to density. 
Note 
All the cost function coefficients have the expected signs and are statistically significant.  The estimated 
coefficients on the output variables can be interpreted as average elasticities; thus a 1 per cent increase 
in passenger train-miles and in freight ton-miles would lead to a rise in total costs of about 0.67% and 
0.26%, respectively. On the basis of the standard measures of scale and density economies proposed 
by Caves et al. our estimate of economies of scale, 1/[(δlnC/δlnP)  +  (δlnC/δlnF)], is 1.08 indicating that 
there were modestly increasing returns to scale.  A similar result obtains for density, 1/(δlnC/δlnD), where
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Appendix Table 2.  Regressions to Predict Train Speeds (dependent 
variable is kilometres per hour) 
 
 Constan
t 
KM KM2 R2 N 
      
1887 Major 
Journeys 
25.685 0.214 -0.0004 0.401 68 
 (7.06) (5.89) (-4.82)   
      
1887 Minor 
Journeys 
24.65 0.210  0.140 269 
 (24.32) (6.69)    
      
1910 Major 
Journeys 
24.299 0.282 -0.0006 0.434 71 
 (5.68) (5.36) (-4.15)   
      
1910 Minor 
Journeys 
27.24 0.054 0.002 0.320 281 
 (19.89) (0.73) (3.16)   
 
Note.  All data were taken from Bradshaw’s Railway Guide.  For major journeys the 
estimation was by weighted least squares where the weights were based on likely 
number of journeys; t-statistics in parentheses. 
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